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Corporate Governance and the Board’s Locus of Control – the case of the ABI’s 
treatment of footprints. 
 
Brian G M Main 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper discusses the degree to which codes of corporate governance and the 
guidelines that develop around them tend to shift the locus of control away from the 
board of directors.  It is argued that even in principles-based codes of governance 
such outcomes are an unavoidable consequence and that policy makers should weigh 
such consequences carefully before promulgating codes and guidelines.  The case of 
the treatment of footprints (incentive plan performance averaging periods) by the 
UK’s Association of British Insurers (ABI) is analysed to illustrate the problem.  
 
 
 
Keywords – Corporate governance; Board process; Executive remuneration; 
Remuneration committee. 
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1. Introduction 
 
 
By their very nature, externally imposed codes of corporate governance represent an 
attempt to wrest some control away from the executives and board of a company.  
This is generally done to protect the interests of the shareholders as a whole or some 
sub-group of shareholders (e.g., minority shareholders versus majority shareholders).  
The basic logic is that by imposing structure on governance arrangements an 
improvement in performance will result (Gompers et al., 2003; Eisner and Schenig, 
2005). Although governance arrangements themselves are endogenous (Demsetz and 
Lehn, 1985; Adams et al., 2008), before-and-after studies of the introduction of codes 
of corporate governance have found evidence of improvements in performance (Stiles 
and Taylor, 1993; Weir and Laing, 2000; Conyon et al., 2002; Dedman, 2002; and 
Dahya et al., 2002; Bebchuk et al., 2009).  Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra (2004) report 
that, in the past 15 years or so, over 50 countries have adopted codes of corporate 
governance. 
 
The positive effects of interventions such as published codes of corporate governance 
may, however, come at the price of unintentionally restricting the profit making 
opportunities of the enterprise through the constraints so imposed on the actions of the 
board.  There is scope for refinement. While the widespread  ‘comply or explain’ 
aspect in many codes aims to minimise such costs, there is no disguising the primary 
intent as being to guide the practices and procedures of the board to “mitigate hazards 
directly related to bounded rationality and opportunism” (Williamson 1996, p12) or 
“to make directors more focused on shareholder interests” (Bebchuk and Fried, 2004, 
p202) or, simply, to ensure “investors get the managers to give them back their 
money” (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997, p738).  This paper uses the recent UK case of 
incentive plan performance averaging periods to argue in favour of placing more 
weight on broad disclosure rather than requiring specific compliance to code. 
 
Codes of governance are generally characterised as adopting one of two main 
approaches – either a rules-based or a principles-based.  In the former, as the label 
suggests, the intervention tends to be explicit and precise.  Companies are left with 
little doubt as to what they should and should not be doing.  The system in the USA, 
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most recently encapsulated in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002, represents this approach.  
On the other hand, the principles-base approach concerns itself with describing 
standards of behaviour and expectations about how issues are to be approached.  The 
UK adopts this latter approach with its essentially self-regulatory system, as 
summarised in the Financial Reporting Council’s Corporate Governance Code (2010) 
(formerly known as the Combined Code).  However, even a principles-base approach, 
which appears to permit more scope to the individual board, can be constraining in 
practice. Companies, in striving for the legitimacy that code conformance brings, find 
themselves in a mimetic isomorphism of practice (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Scott, 
1991, 2001), even where such restricted behaviour is not specifically required.   
 
But the situation is not simply a case of being seen to adjust to the locally 
promulgated code of practice.  As Seidl (2007) explains, a corporate governance code 
offers an observational schema through which the actions of the directors can viewed.  
In all systems but particularly those that are principles based and permit a certain 
flexibility in terms of compliance, there is a need for an evaluation mechanism that 
facilitates the assessment of the extent of adherence to the code or the gravity of any 
explained departures from the code.   
 
Steidl (2007) argues that corporate governance codes are generally incomplete in that 
they lack a mechanism to gauge the sufficiency of the disclosed information, or to 
evaluate the gravity of any deviations for recommended practice and the extent to 
which offered explanations mitigate such breaches.  This lacuna is frequently filled by 
means of ‘commentaries or guidelines to the code’ (Steidl, 2007: 718).  In the UK the 
Association of British Insurers Guidelines on executive remuneration (ABI, 1987, 
1993, 1994, 2001, 2007, 2009) has emerged as a key factor in the governance of 
executive remuneration practice and policy.   Alongside these guidelines, in recent 
years, a commercial evaluation mechanism (IVIS – Institutional Voting Information 
Service) offers a traffic-light system that evaluates a company’s compliance.  Thus a 
company will speak of being ‘red-topped’ or ‘amber topped’ if they have attracted a 
negative or qualified evaluation.  Selvaggi and Upton (2008) find that the IVIS system 
predicts superior company performance. The National Association of Pension 
Schemes initiated a rival evaluation scheme known as RREV (Research 
Recommendations Electronic Voting), now run by Risk Metrics. 
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It is clear, however, that for the UK the ABI defines the dominant observation schema  
for matters pertaining to top executive remuneration.  It is possible to trace out the 
development of remuneration policy through subsequent vintages of these guidelines.  
While it is possible to argue about whether the ABI was codifying de facto 
developments in opinion among institutional investors or actually leading that 
opinion, the move over the years to a near universal adoption of ABI-conforming 
executive remuneration arrangement is clear.  The current prevalence in UK 
boardrooms is to award share-based incentive schemes based on relative performance, 
where there is no payment for below median performance, and where vesting start at a 
modest level and rises up to a maximum level of vesting only once ‘upper quartile’ 
performance has been achieved.  All of this has been shaped through the interpreting 
framework of the ABI Guidelines. 
 
One example of the poor boardroom practice that governance codes aim to tackle can 
be found in the backdating of executive share options in corporate USA, whereby 
executives were presented with share options with issue dates (and hence strike 
prices) chosen in retrospect and to the advantage of the executive.  Thus, a recent low 
period in the company’s share performance would be identified and that date used for 
the effective date of granting share options – even though the award was truly being 
made at a later date (Bebchuk et al., 2007).  On investigation, the practice was found 
to be widespread and several prosecutions were mounted (Lomax, 2008). 
  
While concern was expressed that such behaviour might be widespread in countries 
other than the USA (Mallin, 2007, p. 496), little empirical evidence of such behaviour 
has come to light. Alerted to the general issue, however, attention in the UK has 
focused instead on the timing of the performance periods that are now commonly 
used to determine the extent of vesting of share-based incentive pay for executives.  
In recent versions of its influential guidelines on executive remuneration, the 
Association of British Insurers (ABI, 2007, 2009) requested that companies should 
avoid lengthy averaging periods.  
 
This paper examines the role that such averaging periods play in determining the 
effective reward earned by executives and highlights how overly narrow interpretation 
of governance guidelines can deprive boards of valuable flexibility in designing 
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executive reward packages to suit their particular situation.  There are several 
circumstances in which the board may find it highly desirable to utilise a radically 
different size of footprint (averaging period) than had previously been in use.  
Consider an externally appointed CEO or new top management team arriving at a 
company which had recently been experiencing serious underperformance.  Either 
because of unavoidable legal and administrative delays in getting round to awarding 
long term incentives or because the market has anticipated an impending turnaround 
effect by bidding up the share price on the announcement of the new management 
team, the board may feel it fairer to use a footprint that extends further back than the 
current share price as a basis against which to judge subsequent performance.  On the 
other hand, to always use a long footprint may not be appropriate.  When a scandal or 
external shock suddenly drives down the price of a hitherto high performing  
company, the board may prefer to use, for any newly appointed executive, the recent 
low price of the share as a basis of comparison rather than some past average 
including the previously overpriced phase.   
 
In fact the length of footprint being used is rarely disclosed and this reveals a lacuna 
in governance reporting requirements that leaves practice in this area largely hidden 
from shareholder scrutiny.  While the move requested by the ABI would, in some 
ways, remedy this omission it would do so by imposing an unnecessary and restrictive 
homogeneity of practice in this important area of corporate governance.  It is more 
information not a homogeneity in boardroom practice that is called for. By presenting 
evidence based on the experience over a ten year period of a FTSE-100 sample of 
companies, the paper argues that in imposing restrictions on the actions of the board 
in this area, codes of governance introduce inefficiencies in decision making while 
providing an imperfect regulation of behaviour.  It would be better to allow for 
continued freedom of choice by boards and their remuneration committees - 
conditioned on a new obligation to report such detail to shareholders. 
 
The following section presents a brief introduction to the academic literature in the 
area.  This is followed by a section detailing the empirical analysis undertaken and the 
paper concludes with a discussion of the policy implication of the results. 
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2. Literature review 
 
 
The practice of timing option awards came to light owing to a forensic investigation 
by Lie (2005) of the returns enjoyed by executives on their share options.  These were 
seen to be too good to be true.  Earlier identification of such effects by Yermack 
(1997) had put the outcome down to the timing of information release, whereby 
variously bad or good news was released respectively before or after the anticipated 
grant date of executive share options. Lie (2005) shows that the effect had actually 
strengthened since the Yermack study. 
 
Lomax (2008) explains some of the institutional background to this practice and 
discusses the SEC reaction.  Lie (2005) estimated that as many as 2000 companies 
may have engaged in these practices and the SEC decided to formally investigate 
some 200 companies.  Recently one CEO received a custodial sentence consequent on 
these investigations, although the vast majority of cases have settled out of court.  But 
Heron and Lie (2007) argue that despite new SEC regulations requiring the prompt 
announcement of option grants (hence limiting the scope for ‘timing’), the practice 
persists, albeit in a muted form. 
 
None of these revelations has found any echo in UK boardroom practice. The system 
of corporate governance in the UK is different from that in the USA.  In the USA 
governance practice in the area of executive pay is largely influenced by legislation 
(primarily in the form of Securities and Exchange Commission regulations).  In the 
UK, on the other hand, a series of non-governmental committees of investigation such 
as Cadbury (1992), Greenbury (1995), Hampel (1998) and Higgs (2003) have led to a 
largely self-regulatory approach summarised under the rubric ‘comply or explain’.  
This is brought together under the Combined Code on Corporate Governance (1998, 
2003, and 2006).  The only government intervention has been in the form of the 
Directors’ Remuneration Regulations (DTI 2002, 2008) which, as the title suggests, 
mandate reporting of certain features of directors’ pay and also guarantee that at the 
AGM shareholders shall be allowed an advisory vote on the overall remuneration 
policy of the company. 
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But, in the UK, the dominant influence in the field, as the earlier list of reports 
suggests, has been through institutional pressure. This has resulted in arrangements on 
directors’ reward that are markedly different from those customary in boardrooms in 
the USA.  In the UK, there is a strong emphasis on tying reward to relative 
performance – in particular, performance relative to that of a peer group of companies 
or to a pertinent market index.  Payments, or vesting, on long term incentives such as 
executive share options or performance shares are not expected to occur for 
performance judged to be below median.  And, when vesting does occur, the 
expectation is that the extent of vesting will commence at a moderate level and 
increase with improved relative performance (ABI, 2009).  In this sense, full vesting 
would generally not be expected to occur for anything less than upper-quartile 
performance.  The directors are usually afforded only one opportunity to satisfy the 
performance conditions, as ‘re-testing’ or re-visiting the performance targets at a later 
date is discouraged. 
 
For over 20 years, the Association of British Insurers (ABI, 1987, 2009) through a 
series of ‘Guidelines’ has exerted a dominant influence on the precise administration 
and design of directors’ reward in the UK.  Most recently, the ABI has focused on the 
concept of a ‘footprint’, as used in the context of a performance share plan or 
executive share option scheme.  This is an arrangement whereby the calculation of the 
start and the end values of the performance metric on which vesting of an award 
depends is done so as to average over a period of time, rather than being taken on a 
single start-day and single end-day.  Recent ABI Guidelines have drawn attention to 
the length of such averaging periods or ‘footprints’: 
 
“4.9 The calculation of starting and finishing values for TSR should be made 
by reference to average share prices over a short period of time at the 
beginning and end of the performance period. Lengthy averaging periods 
should be avoided.”  [ABI, 2009, emphasis added] 
 
Footprints, are utilised in order to ‘smooth out’ random fluctuations or non-company-
specific noise affecting the performance measures in question.  These performance 
measures can be free standing or, more usually, gauged against a comparator group or 
index. Among larger UK companies, the commonest footprint is one of three months 
in length, although it is also possible to find examples of  one month, six months, or 
12 months. 
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Work by Booker and Wright (2006) has demonstrated the significant difference to 
eventual vesting that a few days can make in the choice of the start date for a 
performance period, when vesting is contingent upon relative performance metrics.  
This observation reflects the general finding of Acker and Duck (2007) and Dimitrov 
and Govindaraj (2007) that the choice of a particular reference day from which to 
calculate monthly returns or variances can lead to substantial variation in estimates so 
derived.  Acker and Duck (2007) point out that such sampling risk or ‘estimation risk’ 
can lead to significant differences in inferences made from market data, such as 
estimates of the market ‘beta’ of a firm.  In the context of executive pay, the use of an 
averaging period or footprint can be seen as insuring the director and the company 
against such reference-day risk.  
 
The assumption underlying the ABI advice discussed above is, clearly, that the 
executives of a company somehow stand to gain by utilising a longer rather than 
shorter footprint.  This paper sets out to subject this assumption to empirical testing.  
In so doing, it reveals that there is no consistent advantage to be gained by choosing 
one length of footprint versus another.  There is, therefore, no merit in the ABI 
guidelines insisting on short footprints.  On the other hand, the analysis presented 
below does reveal a clear advantage to be had on the part of an executive from 
opportunistically switching the length of the footprint to be deployed at certain critical 
times.  This calls for transparency and the need for board to report their chosen 
footprint lengths and to explain any changes being introduced. 
 
So, while the statistical evidence presented below suggests that there is no good 
reason for inhibiting companies from choosing one length of footprint versus another, 
there seem to be very good reasons for requiring companies to fully disclose the 
length of footprint deployed in their various performance schemes and to justify any 
alteration in these lengths.  At the moment, the length of the footprint utilised in any 
performance scheme is not a parameter that demands disclosure. 
 
The next section of the paper introduces the method and data to be used in the 
estimations undertaken on the impact of the choice of footprint length on subsequent 
vesting of long-term incentive schemes.  Section 4 discusses the results in some 
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detail, and the paper concludes with a summary of results and some policy 
recommendations. 
 
 
 
3. Method 
 
 
In order to study the impact of choice of footprint length on subsequent vesting levels, 
daily performance data are assembled for a 10-year period (1998-2007) on 100 
companies selected by their membership of the FTSE100 (in January 2008). For those 
lacking a 10-year continuous share-price history, as the nearest replacement 
companies at that date, as judged by market capitalisation (Main et al., 2008). The 
performance measure used throughout is DataStream’s daily ‘RI’ index of total 
shareholder return (TSR) – dividend yield plus share price appreciation. 
 
It is necessary to reserve the first year of data for use in calculating initial footprints 
and the assumed three year vesting period requires the end three years of data to 
observe the final performance plan come to its completion. This means that for each 
company on each trading day between 1 January 1999 and 31 December 2004 it was 
possible to follow a three-year performance period as it starts and subsequently vests. 
The implications for vesting for each company performance share plan can then be 
calculated.  This is done for each of five sizes of assumed footprint: (i) none (i.e., one 
day); (ii) one month; (iii) three months; (iv) six months; and (v) 12 months.  
 
The standard performance share plan vesting arrangement focuses on the company’s 
relative TSR as calculated over the three year performance or accrual period (BIS, 
2010) : 
 
RELATIVE RANK: 
No vesting for below median (FTSE100) 
Vesting on a sliding scale starting at 25% 
Maximum vesting (100%) for upper quartile TSR performance. 
 Pro-rata vesting for performance between those points. 
 
  
This scheme is designed to be generally representative (see, for example Kingfisher 
plc Annual Report and Accounts for 2006/07, p.44).  An arithmetic average is used to 
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calculate each company’s performance measure (the daily RI index from DataStream) 
in both the starting and ending footprint.  The comparator group for each company is 
the remaining 99 of the 100 sample companies.  In practice, the comparator group of 
companies is often smaller in number than the FTSE100, frequently being 
individually tailored to the focal company’s area of activity.  In order to keep a level 
of generality to the study, however, it has been assumed that each company uses the 
same  ‘FTSE100’ comparator group.   
 
For a given length of footprint and a given start date, the outcome under the vesting 
scheme in question can be calculated for each company by following the focal 
company and the peer group for the subsequent three years.  Over the 6-year period in 
which performance share schemes can both start and terminate, this results in 1566 
observations outcomes for each of the 100 companies under any averaging period. 
  
 
 
4. Results 
 
 
Due to the relative performance nature of the incentive scheme, the average level of 
vesting across the 100 companies is always 40.25%, and the lower performing half of 
companies receive zero while the top performing quarter receive 100%, and the 
remainder – those above-median but below upper-quartile performers - receiving 
between 30% and 100% of their shares.  That expected outlook is unchanged no 
matter what length of footprint is chosen.  From this perspective, then, there is no 
particular gain to the executive from one length of footprint (1-month, say) versus 
another (1-year, say).  
 
But each individual company (and hence director) may see their fortunes change 
depending on the exact size of the averaging period that is used to make the 
performance calculations over any one three year period.  In some circumstances the 
achieved vesting would be higher, in others it would be lower. Table 1 illustrates this 
variation by contrasting the experience over the 1566 comparator periods for each of 
the companies, comparing a 1-day comparison period with a variety of longer 
averaging periods.  It can be seen that some companies do better and some worse.  
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Others, of course, have a performance record that is so poor (or so very good) that 
changing the reference periods makes little difference.   
 
The scope for change clearly depends on the size of the change of footprint or 
averaging period.  Consistently moving for a 1-day to a 1-month footprint makes very 
little difference on average – just over 1-percentage point worse off or 1-percentage 
point better off, at most. On the other hand, moving from a 1-day to a 12-month 
footprint can result at some companies of as much as 12% fewer shares vesting over 
the period to as much as an extra 10% in some cases.  This is a 22% range and shows 
that being able to choose the footprint length ex-post could be highly advantageous to 
the executives concerned. Chart 1 illustrates the scope for change in moving between 
these two footprints (1-day versus 12-month).  Chart 1 reports the impact on the 
average vesting experienced by each of the 100 companies over all schemes starting 
on each of the 1566 days under study (from the beginning of January 1999 through 
the end of December 2004). For each company, the average level of vesting achieved 
is computed and the difference under the two footprints is reported in Chart 1.  Quite 
clearly, the  lengthening the footprint does not always imply improved the vesting 
outcome at the company in question.  For some companies, the 1-year footprint 
improves the average vesting experience, and for others it is worse. 
 
In an effort to examine the scope available to directors to cynically increase their level 
of vesting by optimal choice of vesting period, each company is followed over the 
time period and the average vesting outcome experienced by consistently having a 1-
day footprint is  compared with the average outcome of being able to choose that 
footprint length that would yield the highest vesting available.  In some cases, clearly, 
the company’s prospects are either so dismal or so outstandingly good that footprint 
length is of little consequence.  But in other situations (as Chart 2 demonstrates) there 
will be a measurable impact.  Chart 2 ranks companies by their 1-day vesting 
experience and demonstrates the scope for increasing this by varying the footprint 
length optimally.  By definition, a company cannot be worse off under the ‘best 
available’ situation.  The average improvement is 8.5 percentage points (with a 
statistically significance of 0.001).  
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Chart 3 ranks companies by the size of the potential gain in vesting through always 
being able to choose ex-post the optimal footprint size.  For almost all companies 
there is a potential upside in vesting from shifting the length of footprint at various 
times.  The maximum is 19.5 percentage points and the average is an 8.5 percentage 
point increase in shares vesting.  Of course, in the above simulations of behaviour the 
choice of footprint length is fully informed by the subsequent full performance 
history.  In reality the choice, if any, would be made without the benefit of most of 
that information.  Nevertheless, the adoption or withdrawal from a 1-year footprint 
would have the advantage of at least one year of observed company performance 
history.   
 
 
 
5. Conclusion and Discussion 
 
 
This paper has discussed the need for boards to guard against losing control on their 
decision making to governance codes and guidelines.  It draws on one particular case, 
that of the ABI’s attempt to control the abuse of the selection of reference dates 
(footprint) over which to calculate the performance of executives for the purpose of 
vesting of long term incentives.  Using daily data on the performance of the FTSE100 
companies over a period of some 10 years, it demonstrates that, while there is a 
potential for abuse, strict adherence to the ABI guideline needlessly robs the board of 
the ability to tailor the design of its long term executive incentives in an appropriate 
manner. The expected payout is the same under all footprints.  The danger lies in 
opportunistic changes in the length of the footprint not in any particular length of 
footprint. 
 
Rather than prescribing a length of footprint, a more efficacious approach would have 
been to require full disclosure of the footprints used and a full explanation and 
justification of any changes in these. There are times when a change of footprint may 
be justified.  Say, the announcement of an incoming, externally recruited CEO has 
boosted what had been a faltering share price, then it might be argued that there was 
justification to change the footprint from a one-month (say) to a six-month length -  
particularly as it usually is a month or two after appointment before any performance 
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share awards are actually made.  Such arguments should be explicitly made to 
shareholders and should appear in the Directors’ Remuneration Report.  To ensure all 
such changes are transparent, it should be a reporting requirement that the length of 
all footprints utilised in performance evaluation be clearly reported on an annual 
basis.   
 
There is, of course, a point to the ABI’s guideline.  On revisiting any three year period 
of a company’s history, it is easy, with the benefit of hindsight, to see that one 
particular length of averaging period or ‘footprint’ would have resulted in higher 
vesting of options or performance shares than alternatives.  Thus, a company that just 
before the beginning of a performance period had suddenly stumbled and fallen 
behind others in its peer group would be better off with a short ‘footprint’, so that 
subsequent performance was more likely to look comparatively good. For example, a 
company hitherto operating on a one-year footprint which, having had a stunning 
recent 12 months (let us say by stealing a march on the competition and being an early 
adopter of some cost-saving technology), has recently seen performance falter as 
rivals catch up.  To reduce the footprint on the next issue of performance shares 
would unambiguously (and undeservedly) advantage the incumbent top management 
team.   
 
To avoid such possibilities, it may seem better to essentially remove any discretion, 
by encouraging all to use uniformly short averaging periods.  But this is to place 
companies in an iron cage (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983) of isomorphic practice.  
Better to simply require full disclosure, thereby leaving the board in control of the 
incentive arrangements for its executive.  
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 N Range Minimum Maximum Mean 
DEL_1_month_mean 100 .03 -.01 .01 .0000 
DEL_3_months_mean 100 .06 -.03 .03 .0000 
DEL_6_months_mean 100 .12 -.07 .05 .0000 
DEL_12_months_mean 100 .22 -.12 .10 .0000 
Table 1 
 
Distribution of each of the 100 companies’ average vesting experience 
under various footprint lengths 
KEY: 
 
DEL_1_month_mean   = difference in average vesting [1-month footprint – 1-day footprint] 
DEL_3_months_mean  = difference in average vesting [3-month footprint – 1-day footprint] 
DEL_6_months_mean  = difference in average vesting [6-month footprint – 1-day footprint] 
DEL_12_months_mean = difference in average vesting [1-year footprint – 1-day footprint] 
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Chart 1 
Distribution of change in average vesting in moving to 1-year Footprint 
from 1-day Footprint (Rank-test vesting). 
 
N = 100; Range = .22; Minimum = -.12; Maximum = .10; Mean = .0000; Std. Dev. = .05688 
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Chart 2 
1-day Footprint versus Best Available (Relative-Rank test)
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Chart 3 
Maximum Potential Gain by Varying Footprint Length
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